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This paper documents the role of angel funding for the growth, survival, and access to follow-on funding
of high-growth start-up firms. We use a regression discontinuity approach to control for unobserved
heterogeneity between firms that obtain funding and those that do not. This technique exploits that
a small change in the collective interest levels of the angels can lead to a discrete change in the probability
of funding for otherwise comparable ventures. We first show that angel funding is positively correlated
with higher survival, additional fundraising outside the angel group, and faster growth measured through
growth in web site traffic. The improvements typically range between 30% and 50%. When using
the regression discontinuity approach, we still find a strong, positive effect of angel funding on the
survival and growth of ventures, but not on access to additional financing. Overall, the results suggest
that the bundle of inputs that angel investors provide have a large and significant impact on the success
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One of the central and most enduring questions in the entrepreneurial finance literature is 
the extent to which early stage financiers such as angels or venture funds have a real impact on 
the firms in which they invest. An extensive theoretical literature suggests the combination of 
intensive monitoring, staged investments, and powerful control rights in these types of deals 
should alleviate agency problems between entrepreneurs and institutional investors (examples 
include Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; Berglöf, 1994; Bergmann and Hege, 1998; Cornelli and 
Yosha,  2003;  and  Hellmann,  1998).  This  bundle  of  inputs,  the  works  suggest,  can  lead  to 
improved  governance  and  operations  in  the  portfolio  firms,  lower  capital  constraints,  and 
ultimately stronger firm growth and performance. 
But the empirical documentation of this claim has been challenging. Hellmann and Puri 
(2000) provide a first detailed comparison of the growth path of venture backed versus non 
venture backed firms.
1  This approach, however, faces  the natural challenge that unobserved 
heterogeneity across entrepreneurs, such as ability or ambition, might drive the growth path of 
the firms as well as the venture capitalists‘ decision to invest. These problems are particularly 
acute  for  evaluating  early-stage  investments.  An  alternative  approach  is  to  find  exogenous 
shocks to the level of venture financing. Examples of such exogenous shocks are public policy 
changes (Kortum and Lerner, 2000), variations in endowment returns (Samila and Sorenson, 
2010),  and  differences  in  state  pension  funding  levels  (Mollica  and  Zingales,  2007).  These 
studies, however, can only examine the impact of entrepreneurial finance activity at an aggregate 
level.  Given  the  very  modest  share  that  high-potential  growth  firms  represent  of  all 
                                                           
1 A similar approach is taken in Puri and Zarutskie (2008) and Chemmanur et al. (2009) who 
employ comprehensive Census Bureau records of private firms to form more detailed control 
groups based on observable characteristics. 3 
 
entrepreneurial  ventures  and  economic  activity  overall,  these  studies  face  a  ―needle  in  the 
haystack‖ type challenge to detect any results. 
This paper takes a fresh look at the question of whether entrepreneurial financiers affect 
the success and growth of new ventures. We focus on a neglected segment of entrepreneurial 
finance:  angel  investments.  Angel  investors  have  received  much  less  attention  than  venture 
capitalists, despite the fact that some estimates suggest that these investors are as significant a 
force for high-potential start-up investments as venture capitalists, and even more significant 
investors elsewhere (Shane, 2008; Goldfarb et al., 2007; Sudek et al., 2008). Angel investors are 
increasingly  structured  as  semi-formal  networks  of  high  net  worth  individuals,  often  former 
entrepreneurs themselves, who meet in regular intervals (usually once a month for breakfast or 
dinner)  to  hear  aspiring  entrepreneurs  pitch  their  business  plans.  The  angels  then  decide  to 
conduct further due diligence and ultimately whether to invest in some of these deals either 
individually or in subgroups of the members. Similarly to traditional venture capital investments, 
angel investment groups often adopt a very hands-on role in the deals they get involved in and 
provide entrepreneurs with advice and contacts to potential business partners. 
In addition to their inherent interest as funders of early stage companies, angel investment 
groups are distinguished from the majority of traditional venture capital organizations by the fact 
that they make their investment decisions through well documented collections of interest and, in 
some cases, formal votes. By way of contrast, the venture firms that we talked to all employ a 
consensual process,  in  which controversial  proposals are withdrawn before coming up for a 
formal vote or disagreements are resolved in conversations before the actual voting takes place. 
In addition, venture firms also rarely document the detailed voting behind their decisions. Angel 
investors, in contrast, express their interest for deals independently from one another and based 4 
 
upon personal assessment. This allows us to observe the level of support or lack thereof for the 
different deals that come before the angel group. 
These properties allow us to undertake a regression discontinuity design using data from 
two angel investment groups. This approach, while today widely used in program evaluations by 
economists (Lee and Lemieux, 2009), remains underutilized in financial economics (exceptions 
include Rauh, 2006; and Cherenko and Sunderam, 2009). We essentially compare firms that fall 
just  above  and  those  that  are  just  below  the  criteria  for  funding  for  the  angel  group.  The 
underlying identification relies on the idea that firms that fall just around the cut-off level have 
very similar ex ante characteristics that allow us to estimate the causal effect of obtaining angel 
financing. After showing the ex ante comparability of the ventures in the border region, we 
examine differences in their long-run performance. In this way, we can employ micro-data on 
firm outcomes while minimizing the problem of unobserved heterogeneity between the funded 
and rejected transactions.  
Several  clear  patterns  emerge  from  our  analysis:  First,  and  maybe  not  surprisingly, 
companies that elicit higher interest in initial voting at the angel meeting are far more likely to be 
ultimately funded by the angel groups. More importantly, angel groups display break points or 
discontinuities where a small change in the collective interest levels of the angels leads to a 
discrete  change  in  the  probability  of  funding  among  otherwise  comparable  ventures.  This 
provides a powerful empirical foothold for overcoming quality differences and selection bias 
between funded and unfunded ventures. 
Second, we look at the impact of angel funding on performance and access to follow-on 
financing for firms that received angel funding compared to those that did not. We first compare 
the  outcomes  for  the  full  sample  of  firms  that  pitched  to  the  angels  and  then  narrow  our 5 
 
identification strategy to the firms that fall just above and below the funding breakpoint we 
identified. We show that funded firms are significantly more like to survive for at least four years 
(or until 2010) and to raise additional financing outside the angel group. They are also more 
likely to show improved venture performance and growth as measured through growth in web 
site traffic and web site rankings. The improvement gains typically range between 30% and 50%.  
An  analysis  of  ventures  just  above  and  below  the  threshold,  which  removes  the 
endogeneity of funding and many omitted variable biases, confirms the importance of receiving 
angel investments for the survival and growth of the venture. However, we do not see an impact 
of angel funding on accessing additional financing using this regression discontinuity approach. 
This may suggest that access to additional financing might often be a by-product of how angel 
funded firms grow but that this path may not be essential for venture success as we measure it. In 
addition, the result on follow-on venture funding might underline that in the time period we 
study, prior angel financing was not an essential prerequisite to accessing follow-on funding. 
However, the results overall suggest that the bundle of inputs that angel investors provide have a 
large and significant impact on the success and survival of the firms. 
Finally,  we  also  show  that  the  impact  of  angel  funding  on  firm  outcomes  would  be 
overstated if we look at the full distribution of ventures that approach the angel groups, since 
there is a clear correlation between the quality of the start up and the level of interest. Simply 
restricting the treatment and control groups to a narrow range around the border discontinuity 
reduces the measured effects by a quarter from the raw correlations. This result reinforces the 
need to focus on the regression discontinuity approach we follow in this paper. 
Thus,  this  paper  provides  a  fresh  look  and  new  evidence  at  an  essential  question  in 
entrepreneurial  finance.  It  quantifies  the  positive  impact  that  angel  investors  make  to  the 6 
 
companies  that  they  fund  in  a  way  that  simultaneously  exploits  novel,  rich  micro-data  and 
addresses concerns about unobserved heterogeneity. Our work is closest in spirit to the papers in 
the entrepreneurial finance literature that focus on the investment process of venture capitalist. 
For example, Sorensen (2007) assesses the returns to being funded by different tiers of investors. 
Our  work  instead  focuses  on  the  margin  of  obtaining  initial  funding  or  not.  Kaplan  and 
Stromberg  (2004)  and  Kaplan  et  al.  (2009)  examine  the  characteristics  and  dimensions  that 
venture capitalists rely on when making investment decisions. 
The  plan  of  this  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  1  reviews  the  angel  group  investment 
process. Section 2 introduces our angel investment data and describes our methodology. Section 
3 introduces our outcomes data. Section 4 presents the analysis. The final section concludes the 
paper. 
 
1. The Angel Group Investment Process 
Angel investments—or equity investments by individuals into high-risk ventures—is an 
among the oldest of human commercial activities, dating back at least as far as the investment 
agreements  recorded  in  the  Code  of  Hammurabi  circa  1790  B.C.  For  most  of  American 
economic history, angels represented the primary way in which entrepreneurs obtained high-risk 
capital  for  start-up  businesses  (e.g.,  Lamoreaux,  Levenstein  and  Sokoloff,  2004),  whether 
directly through individuals or through the offices that managed the wealth of high net worth 
individuals beginning in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Wealthy families such as the 
Phippses, Rockefellers, Vanderbilts, and Whitneys invested in and advised a variety of business 
enterprises, including the predecessor entities to AT&T, Eastern Airlines, McDonald-Douglas, 
and W.R. Grace. 7 
 
The first formal venture capital firm, however, was not established until after World War 
II: American Research and Development (ARD) was formed by MIT President Karl Compton, 
Harvard Business School Professor Georges F. Doriot, and Boston business leaders in 1946. 
Over time, a number of the family offices transformed as well into stand-alone venture firms, 
including such groups as Bessemer, Venrock, and J.H. Whitney. 
While angel investors have a long history, angel investment groups are a quite recent 
phenomenon. Beginning in the mid 1990s, angels began forming groups to collectively evaluate 
and invest in entrepreneurial ventures. These groups are seen as having several advantages by the 
angels. First, angels can pool their capital to make larger investments than they could otherwise. 
Second, each angel can invest smaller amounts in individual ventures, allowing participation in 
more opportunities and diversification of investment risks. They can also undertake costly due 
diligence of prospective investments as a group, reducing the burdens for individual members. 
Fourth, these groups are generally more visible to entrepreneurs and thus receive a superior deal 
flow. Finally, the groups frequently include some of the most sophisticated and active angel 
investors in the region, which results in superior decision-making. 
The Angel Capital Association (ACA) lists 300 American groups in its database. The 
average ACA member angel group had 42 member angels and invested a total of $1.94 million 
in 7.3 deals in 2007. Between 10,000 and 15,000 angels are believed to belong to angel groups in 
the U.S.
2 
Most groups follow a template that is more or less similar. Entrepreneurs typically begin 
the process by  submitting to the group an application that may also include  a copy of their 
business plan or executive summary. The firms, after an initial screening by the staff, are then 
                                                           
2 Statistics are based on http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/ (accessed February 15, 2010). 8 
 
invited to give a short presentation to a small group of members, followed by a question-and-
answer session. Promising companies are then invited to present at a monthly meeting (often a 
weekday breakfast or dinner). The presenting companies that generate the greatest interest then 
enter a detailed due diligence process, although the extent to which due diligence and screening 
leads or follows the formal presentation varies across groups. A small group of angel members 
conduct  this  additional,  intensive  evaluation.  If  all  goes  well,  this  process  results  in  an 
investment one to three months after the presentation. Figure 1 provides a detailed template for 
Tech Coast Angels (Sudek et al. 2008). 
   
2. Angel Group Data and Empirical Methodology 
This section jointly introduces our data and empirical methodology. The discussion is 
organized  around  the  two  groups  from  which  we  have  obtained  large  datasets.  The  unique 
features of each investment group, their venture selection procedures, and their data records 
require  that  we  employ  conceptually  similar,  but  operationally  different,  techniques  for 
identifying group-specific discontinuities. We commence with Tech Coast Angels, the larger of 
our two investment groups, and we devote extra time in this first data description to also convey 
our  empirical  approach  and  the  biases  it  is  meant  to  address.  We  then  describe  our 
complementary  approach  with  CommonAngels  and  how  we  ultimately  join  the  two  groups 
together to analyze their joint behavior. 
 
2.1. Tech Coast Angels 
Tech Coast Angels is a large angel investment group based in southern California. They 
have over 300 angels in five chapters seeking high-growth investments in a variety of high-tech 9 
 
and low-tech industries. The group typically looks for funding opportunities of $1 million or less.  
Additional details on this venture group are available at http://www.techcoastangels.com/.  
Tech Coast Angels kindly provided us with access to their database regarding prospective 
ventures  under  explicit  restrictions  that  the  confidentiality  of  individual  ventures  and  angels 
remain secure. For our study, this database was exceptional in that it allowed us to fully observe 
the deal flow of Tech Coast Angels. Our analysis considers ventures that approached Tech Coast 
Angels between 2001 and 2006. We thus mainly build upon data records that existed in early 
2007.  At  this  time,  there  were  over  2500  ventures  in  the  database.  The  database  is  also 
exceptional in that it has detailed information about many of the companies that are not funded 
by Tech Coast Angels. 
We first document in Table 1 the distribution of interest from the angel investors across 
the full set of potential deals. This description sets the stage for identifying a narrower group of 
firms  around  a  funding  discontinuity  that  offers  a  better  approach  for  evaluating  the 
consequences  of  angel  financing.  Table  2  then  evaluates  the  ex  ante  comparability  of  deals 
around the border, which is essential for the identification strategy. 
The central variable for the Tech Coast Angel analysis is a count of the number of angels 
expressing interest in a given deal. This indication of interest does not represent a financial 
commitment, but instead expresses a belief that the venture should be pursued further by the 
group.  The  decision  to  invest  ultimately  depends  upon  a  few  angels  taking  the  lead  and 
championing the deal. While this strength of conviction is unobserved, we can observe how 
funding relates to obtaining a critical mass of interested angels. 
Table 1 documents  the  distribution of deals  and angel  interest  levels.  The first  three 
columns  of Table 1  show 64% of ventures  receive no interest  at  all. Moreover, 90% of all 10 
 
ventures receive interest by fewer than ten angels.  This narrowing funnel continues until the 
highest bracket, where there  are 44 firms that receive interest from 35 or more angels.  The 
maximum observed interest is 191 angels.  This funnel shares many of the anecdotal traits of 
venture funding—such as selecting a few worthy ventures out of thousands of business plans—
but it is exceptionally rare to have the interest level documented consistently throughout the 
distribution and independent of actual funding outcomes. 
The shape of this funnel has several potential interpretations.  It may reflect heterogeneity 
in quality among companies that are being pitched to the angels. It could also reflect simple 
industry differences across ventures. For example, the average software venture may receive 
greater  interest  than  a  medical  devices  company  if  there  are  more  angels  within  the  group 
involved in the software industry.  There could also be an element of herding around ―hot deals‖. 
But independent of what exactly drives this investment behavior of angels, we want to explore 
whether there are discontinuities in interest levels such that small changes in angels expressing 
interest among otherwise comparable deals results in material shifts in funding probability. 
The central idea behind this identification strategy is that angel interest in ventures does 
not map one-to-one into quality differences across ventures, which we verify empirically below. 
Instead, there is some randomness or noise in why some firms receive n votes and others receive 
n+1. It is reasonable to believe that there are enough idiosyncrasies in the preferences and beliefs 
of angels  so  that the  interest count  does not  present  a perfect  ranking  of the quality of the 
underlying  firms.  Certainly,  the  2%  of  ventures  with  35  or  more  interested  angels  are  not 
comparable to the 64% of ventures with zero interest.  But we will show that ventures with 18 
votes and 22 votes are much more comparable, except that the latter group is much more likely 
to be funded. 11 
 
We  thus  need  to  demonstrate  two  pieces.    First,  we  need  to  identify  where  in  the 
distribution  do  small  changes  in  interest  level  lead  to  a  critical  mass  of  angels,  and  thus  a 
substantial increase in funding probability.  As Tech Coast Angels does not have explicit funding 
rules that yield a mandated cut-off, we must identify from observed behavior where de facto 
breaks exist.  We then need to show that deals immediately above and below this threshold 
appear similar at the time that they approached Tech Coast Angels. 
To investigate the first part, the last column of Table 1 documents the fraction of ventures 
in each interest group that are ultimately funded by Tech Coast Angels.  None of the ventures 
with zero interest are funded, whereas over 40% of deals in the highest interest category are.  
The rise in funding probability with interest level is monotonic with interest, excepting some 
small fluctuations at high interest levels. 
There is a very stark jump in funding probability between interest levels of 15-19 angels 
and 20-24 angels, where the funded share increases from 17% to 38%. This represents a distinct 
and permanent shift in the relationship between funding and interest levels.  We thus identify this 
point as our discontinuity for Tech Coast Angels.  In most of what follows, we discard deals that 
are far away from this threshold, and instead look around the border.  We specifically drop the 
90% of deals with fewer than ten interested angels, and we drop the 44 deals with very high 
interest levels.  We designate our ―above border‖ group as those ventures with interest levels of 
20-34; our ―below border‖ group is defined as ventures with 10-19 interest levels. 
Having  identified  from  the  data  the  border  discontinuity,  we  now  verify  the  second 
requirement that ventures above and below the border look ex ante comparable except that they 
received funding from Tech Coast Angels. This step is necessary to assert that we have identified 
a quasi exogenous component to angel investing that is not merely reflecting underlying quality 12 
 
differences among the firms.  Once established, a comparison of the outcomes of above border 
versus below border ventures will provide a better estimate of the role of angel financing in 
venture success as the quality differences inherent in the Table 1‘s distribution will be removed. 
Before assessing this comparability, we make two sample adjustments.  First, to allow us 
to  later  jointly  analyze  our  two  investment  groups,  we  restrict  the  sample  to  ventures  that 
approached  Tech  Coast  Angels  in  the  2001-2006  period.  This  restriction  also  allows  us  a 
minimum horizon of four years for measuring outcomes. Second, we remove cases where the 
funding opportunity is  withdrawn from  consideration by the venture itself. These withdrawn 
deals are mainly due to ventures being funded by venture capital firms (i.e., the venture was 
courting multiple financiers simultaneously). As these deals do not fit well into our conceptual 
experiment of the benefits and costs of receiving or being denied angel funding, it is best to omit 
them from the sample.  Our final sample includes 87 firms from Tech Coast Angels, with 46 
ventures being above the border and 41 below.  45 of the 87 ventures are funded by Tech Coast 
Angels. 
Table 2 shows that the characteristics of ventures above and below the funding threshold 
are very similar to one another ex ante. If our empirical approach is correct, the randomness in 
how localized interest develops will result in the observable characteristic of firms immediately 
above  and  below  the  threshold  not  being  statistically  different.  Table  2  documents  this 
comparability across a number of venture characteristics. Columns 2 and 3 present the means of 
the above border and below border groups, respectively. The fourth column tests for the equality 
of the means, and the t-tests allow for unequal variance. 
The two border groups are very comparable in terms of venture traits, industries, and 
venture stages. The first four rows show that basic characteristics like the amount of funding 13 
 
requested,  the  documents  provided  by  the  venture  to  the  angels,  and  the  firm‘s  number  of 
managers  and  employees  are  not  materially  different  for  the  firms  above  and  below  the 
discontinuity. The same is true for industry composition and stage of the business (e.g., is the 
firm in the idea stage, in its initial marketing and product development stage, or already revenue 
generating). For all of these traits, the null hypothesis that the two groups are similar is not 
rejected.  
While there are no observable differences in the characteristics of the ventures in the first 
three panels, the fourth panel of Table 2 shows that there are significant differences in how 
angels engage with ventures above and below the cut-off. With just a small adjustment in interest 
levels, angels assemble many more documents regarding the venture (evidence of due diligence), 
have more discussion points in their database about the opportunity, and ultimately are 60% 
more likely to fund the venture.  All of these differences are statistically significant.    
 
2.2. CommonAngels 
CommonAngels is the leading angel investment group in Boston, Massachusetts. They 
have  over  70  angels  seeking  high-growth  investments  in  high-tech  industries.  The  group 
typically looks for funding opportunities between $500 thousand and $5 million.  Additional 
details on this venture group are available at http://www.commonangels.com.  
CommonAngels kindly provided us with access to their database regarding prospective 
ventures  under  explicit  restrictions  that  the  confidentiality  of  individual  ventures  and  angels 
remain secure. The complete database for CommonAngels as of early 2007 contains over 2000 
ventures. The funnel process is again such that a small fraction of ventures receive funding. 14 
 
Unlike the Tech Coast Angels data, however, CommonAngels does not record interest for all 
deals. We thus cannot explicitly construct a distribution similar to Table 1. 
CommonAngels  does,  however,  conduct  a  paper-based  poll  of  members  following 
pitches at its monthly breakfast meetings. Most importantly, attending angels give the venture an 
overall  score.  Angels  also  provide  comments  about  ventures  and  potential  investments  they 
might make in the company. Figure 2 provides a recent evaluation sheet. We focus on the overall 
score  provided  by  angels  for  the  venture  as  this  metric  is  collected  on  a  consistent  basis 
throughout the sample period. 
CommonAngels provided us with the original ballots for all pitches between 2001 and 
2006. After dropping two poor quality records, our sample has 63 pitches in total. One potential 
approach would be to order deals by the average interest levels of angels attending the pitch. We 
find, however, that the information content in this measure is limited. Instead, the data strongly 
suggest that the central funding discontinuity exists around the share of attending angels that 
award a venture an extremely high score. During the six years covered, CommonAngels used 
both a five and ten point scale. It is extremely rare that an angel awards a perfect score to a pitch. 
The breaking point for funding instead exists around the share of attending angels that award the 
pitch 90% or more of the maximum score (that is, 4.5 out of 5, 9 out of 10). This is close in spirit 
to the dichotomous expression of interest in the Tech Coast Angels database.  
Some simple statistics describe the non-linear effect.  Of the 63 pitches, 14 ventures 
receive a 90% or above score from at least one angel; no deal receives such a score from more 
than  40%  of  attending  angels.    Of  these  14  deals,  7  deals  are  ultimately  funded  by 
CommonAngels.  Of the 49 other deals, only 11 are funded.  This stark discontinuity is not 
present  when  looking  at  lower  cut-offs  for  interest  levels.  For  example,  all  but  12  ventures 15 
 
receive at least one vote that is 80% of the maximum score (that is, 4 out of 5, 8 out of 10). There 
is further no material difference in funding probability based upon receiving more or fewer 80% 
votes. The same applies to lower cut-offs for interest levels. 
We restrict the sample to the 43 deals that have at least 20% of the attending angels 
giving the presentation  a score that is  80% of  the maximum possible score or above. As a 
specific example, a venture is retained after presenting to a breakfast meeting of 30 angels if at 
least six of those angels score the venture as 8 out of 10 or higher. This step removes the weakest 
presentations and ventures. We then define our border groups based upon the share of attending 
angels that give the venture a score greater than or equal to 90% of the maximum possible score. 
To continue our example, a venture is considered above border if it garners six or more angels 
awarding the venture 9 out of 10 or better. A venture with only five angels at this extreme value 
is classified as below border. 
While distinct, this procedure is conceptually very similar to the sample construction and 
culling undertaken with the Tech Coast Angels data. We only drop 20 Common Angel pitches 
that receive low scores, but that is because the selection into providing a formal pitch to the 
group itself accomplishes much of the pruning. With Tech Coast Angels, we drop 90% of the 
potential deals due to low interest levels. We implicitly do the same with CommonAngels by 
focusing only on the 63 pitches out of over 2000 deals in the full database. 
Our formal empirical analyses jointly consider Tech Coast Angels and CommonAngels. 
To facilitate this merger, we construct simple indicator variables for whether a venture is funded 
or not. We likewise construct an indicator variable for above and below the border discontinuity.  
We  finally  construct  uniform  industry  measures  across  the  groups.  This  pooling  produces  a 
regression sample of 130 ventures. 16 
 
 
3. Outcome Data 
This section documents the data that we collect on venture outcomes. This is the most 
significant challenge for this type of project as we seek comparable data for both funded and 
unfunded ventures. In many cases, the prospective deals are small and recently formed, and may 
not even be incorporated. We develop three broad outcomes: venture survival, venture growth 
and performance as measured by web site traffic data, and subsequent financing events. 
 
3.1. Venture Survival 
Our  simplest  measure  is  firm  survival  as  of  January  2010.  This  survival  date  is  a 
minimum of four years after the potential funding event with the angel group. We develop this 
measure through several data sources. We first directly contacted as many ventures as possible to 
learn their current status. Second, we looked for evidence of the ventures‘ operations in the 
CorpTech and VentureXpert databases. Finally, we examined every venture‘s web site if one 
exists. Existence of a web site is not sufficient for being alive, as some ventures leave a web site 
running after closing operations. We thus based our measurement on how recent various items 
like press releases were.  
In  several  cases,  ventures  have  been  acquired  prior  to  2010.  We  coded  whether  the 
venture was alive or not through a judgment of the size of the acquisition. Ventures are counted 
as alive if the acquisition or merger was a successful exit that included major announcements or 
large dollar amounts. If the event was termed an ―asset sale‖ or similar, we code the venture as 
not having survived. The results below are robust to simply dropping these cases. 
 17 
 
3.2. Venture Performance and Web Site Traffic 
Our second set of metrics quantify whether ventures are growing and performing better in 
the  period  after  the  potential  financing  event.  While  we  would  ideally  consider  a  range  of 
performance  variables  like  employment,  sales,  and  product  introductions,  obtaining  data  on 
private, unfunded ventures is extremely challenging. A substantial number of these ventures do 
not have employees, which limits their coverage even in comprehensive datasets like the Census 
Bureau surveys. We are able to make traction, however, through web traffic records. To our 
knowledge,  this  is  the  first  time  that  this  measure  has  been  employed  in  an  entrepreneurial 
finance study. 
We collected web traffic data from www.alexa.com, one of the largest providers of this 
type of information. Alexa collects its data primarily by tracking the browsing patterns of web 
users who have installed the Alexa Toolbar, a piece of software that attaches itself onto a user‘s 
Internet browser and records the user‘s web use in detail. According to the company, there are 
currently millions of such users. The statistics are then extrapolated from this user subset to the 
Internet population as a whole. The two ‗building block‘ pieces of information collected by the 
toolbar are web reach and page views. Web reach is a measure of what percentage of the total 
number of Internet users visit a website in question, and page views measures how many pages, 
on average, they visit on that website. Multiple page views by the same user in the same day only 
count as one entry in the data. The two usage variables are then combined to produce a variable 
known as site rank, with the most visited sites like Yahoo and Google having lower ranks.  
We collected web traffic data in the summer of 2008 and January 2010. We identify 91 of 
our 130 ventures in one of the two periods, and 58 ventures in both periods. The absolute level of 
web traffic  and its  rank are very dependent  upon the specific traits  and business  models  of 18 
 
ventures. This is true even within broad industry groups as degrees of customer interaction vary.  
Some venture groups may also wish to remain ―under the radar‖ for a few years until they are 
ready  for  product  launch  or  have  obtained  intellectual  property  protection  for  their  work.  
Moreover, the collection method by Alexa may introduce biases for certain venture types. We 
thus consider the changes in web performance for the venture between the two periods.  These 
improvements or declines are more generally comparable across ventures. 
One variable simply compares the log ratio of the web rank in 2010 to that in 2008. This 
variable is attractive in that it measures the magnitudes of improvements and declines in traffic. 
A limitation, however, is that it is only defined for ventures whose web sites are active in both 
periods. We thus also define a second outcome measure as an indicator variable for improved 
venture performance on the web. If we observe the web ranks of a company in both 2008 and 
2010, the indicator variable takes a value of one if the rank in 2010 is better than that in 2008. If 
we  only  observe  the  company  on  the  web  in  2008,  we  deem  its  web  performance  to  have 
declined  by  2010.  Likewise,  if  we  only  observe  a  company  in  2010,  we  deem  its  web 
performance to have improved. This technique allows us to consider all 91 ventures for which 
we observe web traffic at some point, while sacrificing the granularity of the other measure. 
 
3.3. Subsequent Financing Events 
Our final measures describe whether the venture received subsequent financing external 
to  the  angel  group.  We  define  this  measure  through  data  collected  from  CorpTech  and 
VentureXpert, cross-checked with as many ventures directly as possible. We consider a simply 
indicator variable for a subsequent, external financing and a count of the number of financing 




This  section  documents  our  empirical  results.  We  first  more  closely  examine  the 
relationship between border investments and angel funding. We then compare the subsequent 
outcomes  of  funded  ventures  with  non-funded  ventures;  we  likewise  compare  above  border 
ventures with those below the discontinuity. 
 
4.1. Border Discontinuities and Angel Funding 
Table  3  formally  tests  that  there  is  a  significant  discontinuity  in  funding  around  the 
thresholds  for  the  ventures  considered  by  Tech  Coast  Angels  and  CommonAngels.  The 
dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm received funding and zero 
otherwise. The primary explanatory variable is an indicator variable for the venture being above 
or below the interest discontinuity.  
Column 1 controls for angel group fixed effects, year fixed effects, and industry fixed 
effects. Year fixed effects are for the year that the venture approached the angel group. These 
regressions combine data from the two angel groups. Across these two groups, we have 130 
deals  that are  evenly  distributed  above and below the discontinuity. We find that there is  a 
statistically  and  economically  significant  relationship  between  funding  likelihood  and  being 
above the border: being above the border increases funding likelihood by about 33%.  Clearly, 
the border line designation is not an identity or perfect rule, but it does signify a very strong shift 
in funding probability among ventures that are ex ante comparable as shown in Table 2. 
Column 2 shows similar results when we add year*angel group fixed effects.  These 
fixed effects control for the secular trends of each angel group. The funding jump also holds for 20 
 
each  angel  group  individually.  Column  3  repeats  the  regression  controlling  for  deal 
characteristics like firm size and number of employees at the time of the pitch. The sample size 
shrinks to 87 as we only have this information for Tech Coast Angel deals. But despite the 
smaller sample size, we still find a significant difference in funding probability. The magnitude 
of the effect is comparable to the full sample at 29%. Unreported regressions find a group-
specific elasticity for CommonAngels of 0.45 (0.21). These patterns further hold in a variety of 
unreported robustness checks. These results suggest that the identified discontinuities provide a 
reasonable identification strategy. 
 
4.2. The Impact of Funding on Firm Outcomes 
We now look at the relationship between funding and firm outcomes. In the first column 
of Table 4, we regress a dummy variable for whether the venture was alive in 2010 on the 
indicator for whether the firm  received funding from the angel  group. We control for angel 
group,  year,  and  industry  fixed  effects.  The  coefficient  on  indicator  variable  is  0.27  and  is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Firms that received angel funding are 27% more likely to 
survive for at least 4 years.  
Columns 2 through 5 repeat this regression specification for the other outcomes variables. 
Funded companies show improvements in web traffic performance. Funded ventures are 16% 
more likely to have improved performance, but this estimate is not precisely measured. On the 
other hand, our intensive measure of firm performance, the log ratio of web site ranks, finds a 
more powerful effect. Funded ventures show on average 39% stronger improvements in web 
rank than unfunded ventures. 21 
 
Finally, we estimate whether angel funding promotes future funding opportunities. We 
only look at venture funding external to the angel group in question. Column 4 finds a very large 
effect: angel funding increases the likelihood of subsequent venture investment by 44%. This 
relationship is very precisely measured. Column 5 also shows a positive relationship to a count 
of additional venture rounds. Funded firms have about 3.8 more follow-on funding rounds than 
those firms that did not get angel funding in the first place. 
Of course, we cannot tell from this analysis whether angel-backed companies pursue 
different  growth  or  investment  strategies  and  thus  have  to  rely  on  more  external  funding. 
Alternatively,  the  powerful  relationships  could  reflect  a  supply  effect  where  angel  group 
investors  and  board  members  provide  networks,  connections,  and  introductions  that  help 
ventures  access  additional  funding.  We  return  this  issue  below  after  viewing  our  border 
discontinuity results. 
 
4.3. The Role of Sample Construction 
The  results  in  Table  4  suggest  an  important  association  between  angel  funding  and 
venture performance. In describing our data and empirical methodology, we noted several ways 
that  our  analysis  differed  from  a  standard  regression.  We  first  consider  only  ventures  that 
approach  our  angel  investors,  rather  than  attempting  to  draw  similar  firms  from  the  full 
population of business activity to compare to funded ventures. This step helps ensure ex ante 
comparable treatment and control groups in that all the ventures are seeking funding. Second, we 
substantially narrow even this distribution of prospective deals (illustrated in Table 1) until we 
have a group of funded and unfunded companies that are ex ante comparable (show in Table 2). 22 
 
This removes heterogeneous quality in the ventures that approach the angel investors. Finally, 
we introduce the border discontinuity to bring exogenous variation in funding outcomes. 
Before proceeding to the border discontinuity, it is useful to gauge how much the second 
step— narrowing the sample of ventures to remove quality differences inherent in the selection 
funnel—influences  our  regression  estimates.  Table  5  presents  this  analysis  for  one  outcome 
variable and the Tech Coast Angels data. We are restricted to only one outcome variable by the 
intense effort to build any outcomes data for unfunded ventures. The likelihood of receiving 
subsequent venture funding is the easiest variable to extend to the full sample. 
The first column repeats a modified, univariate form of Column 4 in Table 4 with just the 
Tech Coast Angels sample. The elasticities are very similar. The second column expands the 
sample to include 2385 potential ventures in the Tech Coast Angels database. The elasticity 
increases 25% to 0.56. The difference in elasticities between the two columns demonstrates the 
role of sample construction in assessing angel funding and venture performance.  The narrower 
sample provides a more comparable control group. Our rough estimate of the bias due to not 
controlling for heterogeneous quality is thus about a quarter of the true association.  
 
4.4. Border Discontinuities and Firm Outcomes 
Table 6 considers venture outcomes and the border discontinuity. Even with eliminating 
observable heterogeneity through sample selection, the results in Table 4 are still subject to the 
criticism that ventures are endogenously funded. Omitted variables may also be present. Looking 
above and below the funding discontinuity helps us to evaluate whether the ventures that looked 
ex ante comparable, except in their probability of being funded, are now performing differently. 23 
 
This  test  provides  a  measure  of  exogeneity  to  the  relationship  between  angel  financing  and 
venture success. 
Table  6  has  the  same  format  as  Table  5;  the  only  difference  is  that  the  explanatory 
variable is the indicator variable for being above the funding border. The results are similar in 
direction and magnitude for the first three outcomes, although the coefficients in Tables 5 and 6 
are not directly comparable in a strict sense. Being above the border is associated with stronger 
chances for survival and better operating performance as measured by  web site traffic. This 
comparability indicates that endogeneity in funding choices and omitted variable biases are not 
driving these associations for the impact of angel financing. 
On the other hand, the last two columns show no relationship between being above the 
border discontinuity and improved funding prospects in later years. Our experiment thus does not 
confirm that angel financing leads to improved future investment flows to portfolio companies. 
This may indicate the least squares association between current financing and future financing 
reflects the investment and growth strategies of the financiers, but that this path is not necessary 
for venture success as measured by our outcome variables. This interpretation, however, should 
be treated with caution as we are not able to measure a number of outcomes that would be of 
interest (e.g., the ultimate value of the venture at exit). 
 
5. Conclusions and Interpretations 
The  results  of  this  study,  and  our  border  analysis  in  particular,  suggest  that  angel 
investments improve entrepreneurial success. By looking above and below the discontinuity in a 
restricted sample, we remove the most worrisome endogeneity problems and the sorting between 
ventures and investors. We find that the localized increases in interest by angels at break points, 24 
 
which are clearly linked to obtaining critical mass for funding, are associated with discrete jumps 
in future outcomes like survival and stronger web traffic performance. 
Our evidence regarding the role of angel funding for access to future venture financing is 
more mixed. The latter result could suggest that start-up firms during that time period had a 
number of funding options and thus could  go to other financiers when turned down by our 
respective angel groups. Angel funding per se was not central in  whether the firm obtained 
follow-on financing at a later point. However, angel funding by one of the groups in our sample 
does positively affect the long run survival and web traffic of the start-ups. We do not want to 
push this asymmetry too far, but one might speculate that access to capital per se is not the most 
important value added that angel groups bring. Our results suggest that some of the ―softer‖ 
features, such as their mentoring or business contacts, may help new ventures the most. 
Overall we find that the interest levels of angels at the stages of the initial presentation 
and  due  diligence  are  predictive  of  investment  success.  However,  additional  screening  and 
evaluation do not substantially improve the selection and composition of the portfolio further.  
These findings suggest that the selection and screening process is efficient at sorting proposals 
into approximate bins: complete losers, potential winners, and so on. The process has natural 
limitations,  however,  in  further  differentiating  among  the  potential  winners  (e.g.,  Kerr  and 
Nanda, 2009). 
At the same time, this paper has important limitations. Our experiment does not allow us 
to identify the costs to ventures of angel group support (e.g., Hsu, 2004), as equity positions in 
the counterfactual, unfunded ventures are not defined. We thus cannot evaluate whether taking 
the money was worth it from the entrepreneur‘s perspective after these costs are considered. On a 
similar note, we have looked at just a few of the many angel investment groups that are active in 25 
 
the US. Our groups are professionally organized and managed, and it is important for future 
research to examine a broader distribution of investment groups and their impact for venture 
success.  This  project  demonstrates  that  angel  investments  are  important  and  also  offer  an 
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Figure 1: Tech Coast Angels Investment Process 29 
 
Figure 2: CommonAngels Pitch Evaluation Sheet 
 Angel group Number of  Cumulative Share funded
interest level ventures share of ventures by angel group
0 1640 64% 0.000
1-4 537 84% 0.007
5-9 135 90% 0.037
10-14 75 93% 0.120
15-19 52 95% 0.173
20-24 42 96% 0.381
25-29 33 97% 0.303
30-34 21 98% 0.286
35+ 44 100% 0.409
Table 1:  Angel group selection funnel
Notes:  Table documents the selection funnel for Tech Coast Angels.  The vast majority of 
ventures proposed to Tech Coast Angels receive very little interest, with 90% of plans 
obtaining the interest of fewer than ten angels.  A small fraction of ventures obtain 
extremely high interest levels with a maximum of 191 angels expressing interest.  We 
identify an interest level of 20 angels as our border discontinuity.  Our "below border" 
group consists of ventures receiving 10-19 interested angels.  Our "above border" group 
consists of ventures receiving 20-34 interested angels.Traits of ventures above and Above border Below border Two-tailed t-test
below border discontinuity ventures ventures for equality of means
Basic characteristics
Financing sought ($ thousands) 1573 1083 0.277
Documents from company 3.0 2.5 0.600
Management team size 5.8 5.4 0.264
Employee count 13.4 11.2 0.609
Primary industry (%)
Biopharma and healthcare 23.9 29.3 0.579
Computers, electronics, and measurement 15.2 17.1 0.817
Internet and e-commerce 39.1 39.0 0.992
Other industries 21.7 14.6 0.395
Company stage (%)
Good idea 2.2 2.4 0.936
Initial marketing and product development 34.8 46.3 0.279
Revenue generating 63.0 51.2 0.272
Angel group decisions
Documents by angel members 10.5 5.1 0.004
Discussion items by angel members 12.0 6.7 0.002
Share funded 63.0 39.0 0.025
Table 2:  Comparison of groups above and below border discontinuity
Notes:  Table demonstrates the ex ante comparability of ventures above and below the border discontinuity.  Columns 2 
and 3 present the means of the above border and below border groups, respectively.  The fourth column tests for the 
equality of the means, and the t-tests allow for unequal variance.  The first three panels show that the two groups are very 
comparable in terms of venture traits, industries, and venture stage.  The first row tests equality for log value of financing 
sought.  For none of these ex ante traits are the groups statistically different from each other.  The two groups differ 
remarkably, however, in the likelihood of receiving funding.  This is shown in the fourth panel.  Comparisons of the 
subsequent performance of these two groups thus offers a better estimate of the role of angel financing in venture success 
as the quality heterogeneity of ventures inherent in the full distribution of Table 1 is removed.(1) (2) (3)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture being 0.328 0.324 0.292
above the funding border discontinuity  (0.089) (0.094) (0.110)
Angel group, year, and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year x angel group fixed effects Yes
Additional controls Yes
Observations 130 130 87
Table 3:  Border discontinuity and venture funding by angel groups
Notes:  Regressions employ linear probability models to quantify the funding discontinuity in the border region.  Both Tech 
Coast Angels and CommonAngels data are employed excepting Column 3.  Additional controls in Column 3 include stage 
of company and employment levels fixed effects.  A strong, robust increase in funding probability of about 30% exists for 
ventures just above the border discontinuity compared to those below.  Robust standard errors are reported.
(0,1) indicator variable for being funded by angel group(0,1) indicator (0,1) indicator  Log ratio of  (0,1) indicator Count
variable for variable for 2010 web rank variable for of subsequent
venture being improved web to 2008 rank receiving later venture financing
alive in January rank from 2008 (negative values funding external rounds external
2010 to 2010 are improvements) to angel group to angel group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture 0.276 0.162 -0.389 0.438 3.894
funding being received from angel group (0.082) (0.107) (0.212) (0.083) (1.229)
Angel group, year, and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 91 58 130 130
Table 4:  Analysis of angel group financing and venture performance
Notes:  Linear regressions quantify the relationship between funding and venture outcomes.  Both Tech Coast Angels and CommonAngels data for 2001-2006 are 
employed in all regressions.  Differences in sample sizes across columns are due to the availability of outcome variables.  The first column tests whether the venture is 
alive in 2010.  The second and third columns test for improved venture performance through web site traffic data from 2008 to 2010.  Column 2 is an indicator variable 
for improved performance, while Column 3 gives log ratios of web traffic (a negative value indicates better performance).  The last two columns test whether the 
venture received subsequent financing outside of the angel group by 2010.  Across all of these outcomes, funding by an angel group is associated with stronger 
subsequent venture performance.  Robust standard errors are reported.Outcome variable is (0,1) indicator Simple TCA Full TCA
variable for receiving later funding  univariate  univariate 
external to angel group regression with regression with
(see Column 4 of Table 4) border sample complete sample
(1) (2)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture 0.432 0.562
funding being received from angel group (0.095) (0.054)
Observations 87 2385
Table 5:  Border samples versus full samples
Notes:  Linear regressions quantify the role of sample construction in the relationship between 
funding and venture outcomes.  Column 1 repeats a modified, univariate form of the Column 4 in 
Table 4 with just the Tech Coast Angels sample.  Column 2 expands the sample to include all of 
the potential ventures in the Tech Coast Angels database, similar to Table 1.  The difference in 
elasticities between the two columns demonstrates the role of sample construction in assessing 
angel funding and venture performance.  The narrower sample provides a more comparable 
control group.  Robust standard errors are reported.(0,1) indicator (0,1) indicator  Log ratio of  (0,1) indicator Count
variable for variable for 2010 web rank variable for of subsequent
venture being improved web to 2008 rank receiving later venture financing
alive in January rank from 2008 (negative values funding external rounds external
2010 to 2010 are improvements) to angel group to angel group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture being 0.229 0.232 -0.382 0.106 -0.318
above the funding border discontinuity  (0.094) (0.120) (0.249) (0.100) (1.160)
Angel group, year, and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 91 58 130 130
Table 6:  Analysis of border discontinuity and venture performance
Notes:  See Table 4.  Linear regressions quantify the relationship between the border discontinuity and venture outcomes.  Companies above the border are more likely 
to be alive in 2010 and have improved web performance relative to companies below the border.  These results are similar to the funding relationships in Table 4.  The 
border discontinuity in the last two columns, however, is not associated with increased subsequent financing events.